Most economies feature levels of public spending that require more tax revenues than would be generated solely from the pollution taxes set according to the Pigovian principle, that is, set equal to marginal environmental damages. As a consequence, tax systems generally rely on both environmental (corrective) and other taxes. However, economists typically have analyzed environmental taxes without taking into account the presence of other, distortionary taxes. The omission is significant because the consequences of environmental taxes depend fundamentally on the levels of other taxes, including income and commodity taxes. This paper examines how optimal environmental tax rates deviate from rates implied by the Pigovian principle in a second-best setting where other, distortionary taxes are present. Previous investigations of this issue include the partial equilibrium analyses of Dwight R. Lee and Walter S. Misiolek ( 1986) and Wallace E. Oates ( 1991), who derive formulas linking the optimal rate for a newly imposed environmental tax to the marginal excess burden from existing taxes. In a general-equilibrium setting, Agnar Sandmo (1975) and Bovenberg and Frederick van der Ploeg (1994) have demonstrated how the well-known "Ramsey" formula for optimal commodity taxes is altered when one of the consumption commodities generates an externality.1
The present paper contributes to the analytical and empirical literature in three ways. First, it extends earlier analytical work on optimal environmental taxation in a generalequilibrium setting by considering pollution taxes imposed on intermediate inputs. This is a useful extension because many actual environmental regulations and taxes affect the costs of intermediate inputs.2 Second, the paper investigates second-best optimal environmental taxes numerically. Here we expand on the analytical work by employing a numerical general-equilibrium model of the United States. The use of a numerical model enables us to employ a realistic specification of taxes and adopt a fairly detailed representation of production and demand. Our paper thus combines the strengths of analytical and numerical approaches: a stylized analytical model uncovers the major mechanisms at play, while a numerical model explores the empirical significance of these mechanisms in a more realistic setting. Despite considerable differences in the complexity of the analytical and numerical models, we find a strong coherence between the two models' results.
The third contribution of the paper is its numerical investigation of optimal environmental tax policies in the presence of realistic policy constraints. The constraints involve either the inability to alter all tax rates (so that much of the initial, suboptimal tax system re- ' A closely related issue is the extent to which the costs of environmental taxes are lowered when revenues from such taxes are devoted to reductions in existing distortionary taxes. A key question is whether "recycling" the revenues in this way can make the overall cost of the revenueneutral policy zero or negative. For general discussions of this issue see, for example, David W. Pearce (1991), James M. Poterba (1993) , Oates (1995) and Goulder (1995a). For analytical treatments see, for example, Bovenberg and Ruud A. de Mooij (1994) and Ian W. H. Parry (1995) . For numerical investigations see, for example, Robert Shackleton et al. (1996) and Goulder (1995b).
2 For example, taxes on fossil fuels raise the costs of fuel inputs; similarly, specific excises such as taxes on gasoline raise the costs to producers of the transportation services they might employ. 985 mains) or the inability to use revenues from environmental taxes in optimal ways. We find that these constraints substantially affect the optimal environmental tax rates.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I develops a stylized general-equilibrium model to uncover the main determinants of optimal environmental taxes in the presence of distortionary taxes. Section II describes the numerical model, and Section III applies this model to evaluate the departures from Pigovian tax rules implied by second-best considerations. The final section offers conclusions.
I. Theoretical Issues and Analytical Results
This section explores analytically how the presence of distortionary taxes affects the optimal setting of environmental taxes on both intermediate inputs and consumption goods.
To this end, we extend the model in Bovenberg and Ruud de Mooij (1994) by incorporating intermediate inputs. Output derives from a constant-returns-to-scale production function F(L, XC, XD) with inputs not only of labor (L)
but also of "clean" and "dirty" intermediate goods (xc and XD, respectively). Output can be devoted to public consumption (G), to clean or dirty intermediate inputs, or to household consumption of a "clean" or "dirty" consumption good (denoted by Cc and CD, respectively). Hence, the commodity market equilibrium is given by F(L, xc, XD) = G + XC + xD+ CC + CD. We normalize units so that the constant rates of transformation between the five produced commodities are unity.
The representative household maximizes utility U(CC, CD, 1, G, Q) = u(N(H(Cc, CD), 1), G, Q). Private utility N(-) is homothetic, while commodity consumption H(*) is separable from leisure, 1. In addition, private utility is weakly separable from the two public goods, environmental quality (Q) and (nonenvironmental) public consumption (G). These assumptions on utility match the specifications of household behavior in the numerical model (see Section II).
The household faces the budget constraint CC + ( 1 + T c) CD = (1 -rL) wL, where i-c and rL denote, respectively, the tax rates on dirty consumption and labor. Without loss of generality, the tax on clean consumption is assumed to be zero.3 The labor tax rate and the producer (before-tax) wage w yield the consumption (after-tax) where V represents indirect private utility and At denotes the marginal utility associated with the public goods consumption made possible by one additional unit of public revenue. Appendix A derives the optimal tax rates. The analysis reveals that the clean intermediate input should not be taxed (that is, T-= 0). This is an application of the well-known result of Peter A. Diamond and James A. Mirrlees ( 197 la, b) demonstrating that, if production exhibits constant returns to scale,4 an optimal tax system should not distort production.
3 A positive tax on consumption is redundant in that the equivalent to any tax system with a positive tax on consumption can be obtained through suitable combinations of the labor tax and the tax on dirty consumption. This follows from the fact that the labor tax is equivalent to a uniform tax on the two consumption commodities. 4 Under decreasing returns to scale, production efficiency continues to be optimal so long as a 100-percent tax on pure profits is available. 
The optimal tax on the dirty intermediate input is (see Appendix
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The term between the large square brackets on the right-hand side of (2) is the marginal environmental damage (MED) from this input. iq (-i/(OU/dCc)) is defined as the ratio of the marginal (utility) value of public revenue to the marginal utility of private income; it is often referred to as the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF). Analogously, the optimal tax on the dirty consumption good is the marginal environmental damage from the use of this good divided by the MCPF (see Appendix A):' t3Q 3CD 1 ( 3) r D _= 7 acc Equations (2) and (3) indicate how the presence of distortionary taxation affects the optimal environmental tax rate. In general, an optimal pollution tax induces the level of emissions at which the marginal welfare benefit from emissions reductions (MWBE) equals the marginal welfare cost of achieving such reductions (MWCE) *6 In the special case of a first-best world without distortionary taxes, a one-unit reduction in emissions involves a welfare cost corresponding to the loss of tax revenue due to the erosion of the base of the pollution tax-thus the pollution tax rate represents the marginal welfare cost of emissions reductions (MWCE). Hence, in a first-best setting, optimality requires that the pollution tax be set equal to the marginal (environmental) benefit from pollution reduction (or marginal damage from pollution), which is given by the term in the large square brackets in equation (2) or (3). This is the Pigovian tax rate.
The MCPF term in equations (2) and (3) reveals how the presence of distortionary taxes requires a modification of the Pigovian principle. In particular, it shows that the Pigovian rate is optimal if and only if the MCPF is unity. A unitary MCPF means that public funds are no more costly than private funds. The higher the MCPF, the greater the cost of public consumption goods, including the public good of environmental quality. When these goods are more costly, the government finds it optimal to cut down on public consumption of the environment by reducing the pollution tax.
In a second-best world with distortionary taxes, the MCPF is given by (see Appendix A)7:
The MCPF exceeds unity if 1) the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply, OL, iS positive, and 2) the distortionary tax on labor, TL, is positive (which is required if Pigovian taxes are not sufficient to finance public consumption). Combining equation (4) with equation (2) (or (3)), we find that the presence of distortionary labor taxation reduces the optimal pollution tax below its Pigovian level if and only if 9L is positive.8 In a second-best 5 With a different normalization of the tax system, the tax rate on clean consumption can be positive. In that case, the difference between the optimal rates on dirty and clean consumption equals the Pigovian tax divided by the MCPF. No matter what normalization is used and the level of tax on clean consumption, all of the difference between the optimal rates on dirty and clean consumption stems from environmental considerations. This reflects our assumption that commodity consumption is separable from leisure: in the absence of environmental externalities, uniform consumption taxation is optimal. 6 The marginal welfare benefit is the welfare change associated with the increase in environmental quality Q that results from the reduction in pollution. The marginal welfare cost is the negative of the welfare impact from changes in arguments of the private-good subutility function N( ) that result from the pollution-reduction policy. We employ a numerical model of the U.S. economy to examine further the issues of second-best optimal environmental taxation.9 This model enables us to relax restrictions of the analytical model and thereby assess these issues in a more realistic setting. The additional realism includes greater industry disaggregation, a more detailed treatment of the tax system, and attention to capital (in addition to labor) as a primary factor, which permits attention to dynamic effects. The numerical simulations also allow us to evaluate constrained-optimal environmental tax policies, where the constraints involve either the inability to optimize over all tax rates (so that some prior "imperfections" in the tax system remain) or the inability to optimally recycle revenues from environmental taxes.
A. Components and Behavioral Specifications
The model distinguishes the 13 industries (of which 6 are energy-producing industries) and the 17 consumer products identified in Table 1 . In each industry, a nested-CES production structure accounts for substitution between different forms of energy as well as between energy and other inputs. Managers of public consumption that is separable from consumer's choice on leisure and consumption, this literature finds that distortionary labor taxes raise the marginal benefits of public consumption above its direct resource cost if the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply is positive.
' Some details on the model's structure and parameters are offered in Appendix B. A more complete description is in Goulder (1992). Miguel Cruz and Goulder (1992) provide data documentation. firms choose input quantities and investment levels to maximize the value of the firm. Investment decisions take account of adjustment costs that are a convex function of the rate of gross investment. 1 Consumption, labor supply, and saving result from the decisions of a representative household maximizing its intertemporal utility, defined on leisure and overall consumption in each period." As in the analytical model of the previous section, the utility function is homothetic and leisure and consumption are weakly separable. Overall consumption in each period is an aggregate of the 17 types of consumer goods, where each consumer good is in turn a composite of a domestic and foreign consumer good of a given type.
Except for oil and gas imports, imported intermediate and consumer goods are imperfect substitutes for their domestic counterparts. Import prices are exogenous in foreign currency, but the domestic-currency price changes with variations in the exchange rate. Export demands are modeled as functions of the foreign price of U.S. exports and the level of foreign income. The exchange rate adjusts to balance trade in each period.
The government's tax instruments include energy taxes, output taxes, the corporate income tax, property taxes, sales taxes, and taxes on individual labor and capital income. In policy experiments, we require that real government spending and real government debt follow the same paths as in the reference case. 12
B. Equilibrium and Growth
The model generates paths of equilibrium prices, outputs, and incomes for the United States and the "rest of the world" under specified policy scenarios. All domestic prices in the model are endogenous, except for the domestic price of oil and gas, which is determined by the exogenously specified world oil price.'3 The general-equilibrium solution requires that demand equal supply in all markets at all points in time.'4 Equilibria are calculated at yearly intervals beginning in the 1990 benchmark year and usually extending to the year 2070.
Economic growth reflects the growth of capital stocks and of potential labor resources. The growth of capital stocks stems from endogenous saving and investment behavior. Potential labor resources are specified as increasing at an exogenous rate.
III. Optimal Environmental Taxes in a SecondBest Setting: Numerical Results
We focus on the policy of a carbon tax. This is a tax on fossil fuels-coal, crude oil, and natural gas-in proportion to their carbon content. Since carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions generally are proportional to the carbon content of these fuels, a tax based on carbon content is effectively a tax on CO2 emissions.
A. Marginal Costs of Emissions Reductions
Our use of the general equilibrium model is summarized in Figure 1 . We explain this figure in several steps, starting with the vertical axis of Figure lB, which shows the carbon tax rate in dollars per ton. As a first step, this tax rate is set exogenously and the model is used to calculate the general equilibrium associated with each value of the tax rate. Each exogenous setting of the carbon tax rate results in a particular 0 The oil and gas industry differs from the 12 other industries in incorporating a nonproduced input, oil and gas reserves. Unit production costs rise as these reserves are depleted. The "synfuels" industry produces a backstop substitute for oil and gas, which permits the model to achieve a steady state despite the waning production of oil and gas. Details on these specifications are in Goulder (1992).
" The central case value for OL, the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply, is 0.15, which is an average of estimates for primary and secondary earners. The sensitivity analysis (Section III.C) considers alternative values. 12 In the reference case (or status quo) simulation, the debt-GNP ratio is constant over time and the government deficit is 2 percent of GNP. 18 The optimal tax is negative because the carbon subsidy is an implicit subsidy to labor and capital which helps offset the distortions to labor and capital markets generated by explicit factor taxes. In this case the subsidy is financed by a nondistorting, lump-sum tax. For analytical treatments of how environmental taxes act as implicit factor taxes, see Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) and Parry (1995). Table 2 . When revenues are devoted to reductions in marginal income tax rates, the optimal tax lies midway between the optimal tax under lump-sum replacement and the "optimal" tax prescribed by the Pigovian rule. Thus, while suboptimal (lump-sum) use of revenues explains some of the deviation from Pigovian rates, departures from Pigovian rates remain even when revenues are returned through cuts in marginal income tax rates. It is useful to compare these results with the ratio, MED/MCPF, which is the optimal rate implied by the analytical model (equation (2) of Section I). The MCPF depends, in general, on the configuration of all taxes, including whatever carbon taxes are present. We therefore evaluate the MCPF at the new equilibrium after the imposition of the carbon tax.19 A comparison of columns (4) and (6) reveals that the optimal rates from the numerical model are somewhat lower than the rates prescribed by the analytical model.
Fully Optimal Tax Policies.
To what might the differences from the "analytical optimum" be attributed? A potential source of this discrepancy is the nature of the numerical model's benchmark. The analytical model presumes a fully optimized tax system-one in which all tax rates are set optimally. In contrast, the results from column (4) of Table 2 are based on a realistic, suboptimal benchmark reflecting the configuration of taxes in the U.S. economy.20 Thus, the rates in column (4) are constrained optimal tax rates, since the policy involves only incremental changes in other, distortionary taxes to the extent that carbon tax revenues can finance such changes. These simulations do not involve a fully optimized tax system.
To enhance further the comparisons of results across models, we derive the optimal carbon tax in a new, counterfactual scenario in which all taxes are set optimally. Here we develop a configuration of other (noncarbon) taxes that is optimal according to the principles inherent in the analytical model. The optimized configuration of other taxes involves two changes relative to the original benchmark: 1 ) taxes on intermediate inputs, industry 19 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for having pointed out the importance of measuring the MCPF at the post-tax equilibrium. The MCPF in column (5) of Table 2 (MCPFp) applies to funds raised from the personal income tax. 20 An indicator of this suboptimality is the fact that the MCPF differs depending on which tax is employed to raise funds. It is worth noting that we have defined "optimality" strictly in terms of efficiency. Under a broader notion of optimality, differences in MCPF's need not represent deficiencies in the tax system. For example, to the extent that distributional objectives are realized through uneven factor taxation and associated differences in MCPF's, these "suboptimal" features may be constructive elements of the tax system. outputs, and consumer goods are eliminated, and 2) marginal rates of remaining (capital and labor income) taxes are adjusted so that the MCPF is the same for each tax. Since marginal rates of capital and labor taxes depend on the magnitude of the carbon tax (because the carbon tax finances cuts in factor taxes), the MCPF as well is a function of the magnitude of the carbon tax. Thus, the optimal carbon tax and the optimal configuration of other taxes must be determined simultaneously: for each value of marginal environmental benefits from CO2 reductions, there is an optimal carbon tax and an optimal configuration of labor and capital taxes (that is, a set of factor tax rates that manages to equate the MCPF's from labor and capital taxes).21 Figure 1 and Table 2 include results based on this fully optimized system. Figure 1A shows that in this counterfactual scenario, the marginal welfare costs of given emissions reductions are significantly lower than under the realistic tax system.22 Correspondingly, in Table 2 the optimal carbon tax associated with given marginal environmental damages is higher than the optimal tax arising in the realistic case. A comparison of columns (7) and (9) of Table 2 shows that the numerical model's results in this fully optimized case closely approximate the tax rates prescribed by the analytical model.23'24 C. Sensitivity Analysis Table 3 indicates the sensitivity of optimal tax rates to key parameters. These simulations involve changes relative to the realistic (as opposed to optimized) tax system. The table reports results based on a posited value of $75 per ton for the marginal environmental benefits from the carbon tax. All results in the table are for simulations in which carbon tax revenues are recycled through cuts in personal income tax rates.
The general result from Table 3 is that, under the range of parameter values considered, the analytical and numerical models call for optimal tax rates below the Pigovian optimum. The analytical optimum is always below the Pigovian optimum because the MCPF consistently exceeds unity. The numerical model's optimum is always below the prescribed optimum from the analytical model; as discussed above, this reflects the suboptimal nature of the benchmark tax system.
To consider the significance of preexisting taxes, we reduce or increase the marginal rates of all preexisting taxes by 50 percent. The MCPF moves toward unity as the preexisting tax rates are reduced; accordingly, the optimal tax rates from the analytical and simulation models move toward the Pigovian rate of $75/ton.
Higher values for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, the uncompensated elasticity of labor supply, or energy 2" Thus, in Figure IA , the lower-most marginalwelfare-cost schedule should be interpreted as the marginal welfare cost of achieving emissions reductions through a fully optimal tax system; the configuration of factor taxes changes with the extent of emissions reductions (although the path of real govemment spending is the same in all cases). However, we find that the optimal rates for capital and labor taxes change only slightly with changes in the assumed marginal benefits from CO2 reductions. 22 This reflects two aspects of the realistic benchmark. First, in this benchmark, the MCPF from capital taxes is larger than that from labor taxes. Second, the combination of the carbon tax and a cut in personal income taxes tends to raise the tax burden on capital relative to labor (because the carbon tax component falls primarily on capital). As a consequence, the revenue-neutral policy effectively emphasizes the high MCPF of capital. In the counterfactual, fully optimized tax setting, the MCPF from capital taxes is lower than in the realistic benchmark; thus the welfare costs of carbon taxes are lower as well. 23 The slight differences between results in the two columns are due to approximation error. While numerical and analytical results virtually match under the optirnized benchmark, they differ significantly under the realistic benchmark case (compare results of columns (4) and (6)). The differences under the realistic benchmark stem from the fact that the carbon tax imposes a higher cost in the realistic benchmark than under optimal benchmark conditions (for reasons given in the previous footnote). This implies a lower optimal tax than would be endorsed by the analytical formula, which presumes a fully optimized setting.
24 Column (8) of Table 2 suggests the interconnections between marginal environmental damages and the MCPF in an optimized tax system. With marginal environmental damages of $25 per ton, the MCPF is $1.16. But with higher marginal environmental damages (and a higher optimal value for the carbon tax), the MCPF is somewhat lower, as revenues from the (higher) carbon tax permit lower marginal rates on labor and capital. The MCPF is $1.21 if zero marginal environmental damages are assumed (so that the optimal carbon tax is zero). substitution elasticities raise the potential for distortions in capital, labor, or energy markets from a given configuration of taxes. The numerical model generates a higher MCPF with increases in these elasticities; hence the optimal rates prescribed by the analytical model are lower. Changes in these parameters also induce changes in the optimal rates derived directly from the numerical model. These changes are in the same direction as the changes in optimal rates prescribed by the analytical model. Under central case values for parameters, the optimal rate from the numerical model is 69 percent of the Pigovian rate. By comparison, the optimal rate is 57 (73) percent of the Pigovian rate under high (low) values for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption. It is 64 (81) percent of the Pigovian rate under high (low) values for the labor supply elasticity.
IV. Conclusions
This paper has employed analytical and numerical models to examine the generalequilibrium interactions between environmentally motivated taxes and distortionary taxes. The analytical model extends earlier work by examining environmental taxes that, like carbon taxes, apply to internediate inputs. This model indicates that in the presence of distortionary taxes, optimal environmental tax rates are generally below the rates suggested by the Pigovian principle-even when revenues from environmental taxes are used to cut distortionary taxes.
The numerical simulations support this analytical result. Under central values for parameters, optimal carbon tax rates from the numerical model (when the tax system is fully optimized) are between six and twelve percent below the marginal environmental damages.
In addition, the numerical model shows that in the presence of realistic policy constraints, optimal carbon tax rates are far below the marginal environmental damagesand may even be negative. Simulations based on the U.S. tax system indicate that if policy makers can only incrementally alter existing distortionary taxes (rather than globally optimize the tax system), the optimal carbon tax may be substantially below the marginal environmental damages. Moreover, if the revenue changes from carbon taxes are absorbed through changes in lumpsum transfers (rather than through changes in marginal rates of existing distortionary taxes), the optimal rate for this tax becomes negative when marginal environmental damages from carbon emissions are below about $50 per ton.
These considerations suggest that estimates of optimal carbon taxes in integrated climateeconomy models (for example, William D. Nordhaus, 1993,25 and Stephen C. Peck and Thomas J. Teisberg, 1992) are biased upward. For example, Nordhaus has considered how recycling carbon-tax revenues through cuts in distortionary taxes affects the optimal carbon tax. When revenues from the carbon tax are returned in lump-sum fashion, the optimal tax rate for the first decade is about $5 per ton; the optimal rate rises to $59 per ton when revenues are devoted to reducing distortionary taxes. Importantly, that study does not consider how preexisting taxes increase the gross costs of the carbon tax itself (before the revenues are recycled). While the Nordhaus study accounts for the efficiency gains connected with the reduction (through recycling) of initial distortionary taxes, it does not consider the efficiency costs stemming from the interactions between remaining distortionary taxes and the newly imposed carbon tax. The analytical and simulation models in this paper indicate that these interactions augment the costs of the carbon tax and imply an optimal rate below the first-best or Pigovian rate-even in the case where revenues are recycled through cuts in marginal rates of distortionary taxes. where xDj and xFj denote domestic and foreign intermediate inputs of typej. The overall nesting of the production system is summarized in Table Al. yf in the oil and gas production function is endogenous. In industries other than oil and gas, the element y1 in the production function is parametric. In the oil and gas industry, yf is a decreasing function of cumulative oil and gas extraction: Equation (1B7) implies that the production function for oil and gas shifts downward as cumulative oil and gas ex- 
B. Behavior of Firms
In each industry, managers of firms serve stockholders in aiming to maximize the value of the firm. The objective of finn-value maximization determiines firms' choices of input quantities and investment levels in each period of time.
While optimal demands for variable inputs (labor and intermediate inputs) depend only on current prices, optimal investment depends on both present and future prices. In specifying firms' investment decisions, we adopt the asset price approach of Lawrence H. Summers (1981) v is the elasticity of substitution between goods and leisure; a, is an intensity parameter for leisure. In the above equation, CD and CF denote the household's consumption of domestically produced and foreign made consumer good of a given type at a given point in time. For simplicity, we have omitted subscripts designating the type of consumer good and the time period. The household maximizes utility subject to the intertemporal budget constraint given by the following condition governing the change in financial wealth, WK: 
